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 Contemporary discourse on the right to reli-
gious liberty makes a number of claims but argu-
ably none more insistent or polemical than its 
claim to universality. Simultaneously invoking 
notions of neutrality, secularity, freedom, and 
right, the claim is somehow to have located an 
Archimedean vantage point above or independent 
of the contingencies and disorder of politics, cul-
ture, religion, and, indeed, of history itself. Much 
critical scholarship in the history of ideas, how-
ever, has begun to question this reigning narra-
tive to suggest that religious liberty is inescapably 
context bound and inseparable from contingen-
cies of politics, power, and history. This volume is 
a contribution toward this growing scholarship. 
The essays in this volume taken together track 
multiple genealogies of the concept in a variety 
of historical and contemporary contexts that cut 
across the Western and non-Western divide. They 
collectively show that religious liberty is not a sin-
gle, stable principle existing outside of culture, 
spatial geographies, or power relations but is a 
fractious, polyvalent concept unfolding through 
divergent histories in differing political orders.
The first two essays by Ian Hunter and Nehal 
Bhuta take apart one of the common origin stories 
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told about religious liberty in European history, namely, that it helped 
establish the basis for political secularism by separating religion from poli-
tics and making the state indifferent to claims of religious truth. In this 
view, since its initial formulation in seventeenth-century political thought, 
religious liberty has continued progressively to expand its tolerant ambit to 
all religions far beyond its initial mandate to institute peace across Chris-
tian denominations. In revisiting this narrative, Hunter argues that reli-
gious liberty in its earliest formulation in European history was in reality 
an unsteady and unstable concept, the result of a “‘circumstantial casu-
istry’ of historically embedded political concepts” rather than a principled 
commitment to the separation of church and state. Hunter thus points to 
the deep incompatibility within and across three distinct historical concep-
tions of religious liberty: first, Martin Luther’s championing of the freedom 
of all Christian believers in the sixteenth century against the Holy Roman 
Empire’s rejection of this and its attack on the Religious Peace of Augsburg; 
second, the Westphalian repudiation of the cuius regio, eius religio principle 
at the heart of the earlier Augsburg settlement; and third, the conflict within 
seventeenth-century political theory between John Locke’s conception of 
religious toleration developed in the context of the Anglican settlement 
and that advanced by Pufendorf and Thomasius writing in the context of 
German imperial public law and the Brandenburg-Prussian settlement.
Given the historically contingent character of these rival under-
standings, the various philosophical attempts to ground religious liberty 
in transcendent principles—whether in Catholic and Protestant scholas-
ticisms, Lockean and Kantian rationalisms, or Taylorean philosophical 
hermeneutics—have been unable to supersede the incompatibilities at the 
heart of these conceptions since their early history. Hunter argues that 
conflicts over religious freedom have been historically resolved, if at all, by 
legal casuistry and the coercive imposition of judgments within regional 
jurisdictions and national state-religion settlements. Hunter’s primary 
claim, then, is that the intellectual history of religious freedom is to be 
found not in philosophical foundations but in the horizon of “the religious, 
political, and juridical casuistries spawned by the national religious settle-
ments themselves.”
Crucial to the early historical unfolding of the concept of religious 
liberty was the category of adiaphora, those religious activities that are 
deemed unnecessary to salvation. According to Hunter, this category was 
employed in the early modern period to “narrow the array of doctrine and 
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liturgy where salvation was at stake, and to expand the array that could 
be regarded as soteriologically indifferent, hence to be seen not from a 
sacramental-religious standpoint but from a political-juridical one.” Once 
these acts were made inconsequential to salvation, they could then be 
brought under the regulation of civil law. Hunter concludes that long before 
conceptions of subjective natural right or the inviolable autonomy of indi-
vidual belief were ever on offer, early modern legal and political casuistries 
created the bifurcated nature of the concept of religious liberty by seeking 
to distinguish the essentially religious—“inner truths” toward which civil 
authority claimed indifference—from the religiously permissible—which 
were to be left free of sovereign interference except insofar as they threat-
ened social peace.
For Bhuta, this early history is consequential for understanding the 
contemporary formulation of religious liberty as encapsulated in Article 9 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in that it “repre-
sents a wordsmithed bricolage of rights-forms derived from heterogeneous 
traditions and specific political projects.” In addition to this important tra-
jectory in European history, Bhuta lays out two more that undergird the 
current formulation of religious liberty: one emanating from the bourgeois 
Rechtsstaat concept of legal right, which holds that any state intrusion on 
individual liberty be calculable, definable, and controllable; and a second 
from a Protestant conception of personal faith as the religious core that 
ought to be protected from state intervention. Each of these genealogies 
“coexist within the capacious language of freedom of conscience, submerg-
ing or reemerging in new ways to refract the contentious political conflicts 
of the day,” suggests Bhuta.
We see all three of these genealogies at play in the textual structure 
of the right itself. Article 9(1) protects an inviolable right of “everyone” to 
“freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” while Article 9(2) subjects 
the freedom to manifest religion or belief to certain grounds of limitation 
where necessary, for example, to protect “public order” or “the rights of oth-
ers.” Both this structure of the right and its interpretation by the European 
Court rely on a distinction that significantly shapes the modern politics 
of religious freedom. The first element in Article 9(1), known as the forum 
internum, is defined as the locus of religious belief and conscience protected 
absolutely by law while the second element in Article 9(2), known as the 
forum externum, is where the outward expression of this belief is subject 
to state regulation. (Note its consonance with the early modern distinction 
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laid out by Hunter.) Integral to this formulation is the concept of public 
order in the name of which the state accords itself the right to regulate and 
intervene in the latter via either recognition or limitation of manifestations 
of religious belief.
The conceptual architecture of the right is in this respect premised 
on a paradox. On the one hand, it is said to be neutral toward specific reli-
gious beliefs, and indeed neutrality is the leitmotif of modern religious lib-
erty discourse whether in moral, legal, or political contexts. On the other 
hand, the right to religious freedom, as a technology of modern state and 
international legal governance, is deeply implicated in the regulation of reli-
gion. This tension between inviolability and regulation is internal to the con-
cept of religious liberty itself and serves to generate the distinctive antino-
mies and contradictions that arise in struggles over its meaning, justification, 
and realization.
Given this conceptual structure, it is hardly surprising that the legal 
reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting Article 9 
embeds and entangles these long-standing conceptual conundrums. For 
Bhuta, this is strikingly evident in the recent jurisprudence of the court on 
the headscarf in that it accords the state a wide margin of appreciation in the 
name of upholding public order, which itself is grounded in the majoritarian 
Christian values and sensibilities. These decisions taken together, he argues, 
represent a “moral-cultural political theology of democracy as transvalued 
Christianity” while imposing limitations on the public expression of rival 
religious commitments.
Importantly, this conception of religious liberty and its attendant 
antinomies are operative not only in the jurisprudence of the ECHR but 
also of courts in Egypt and India as analyzed in both our contribution and 
Ratna Kapur’s. In each context, the relationship between religion and state is 
distinct: in some cases (Egypt) the religious personality of the state is pro-
nounced whereas in others (India and Italy) it is more muted, and in Europe 
(France and Britain) it is distinctly secular. This dissimilarity between levels 
of secularity would make any comparison impossible for most scholars of 
religious liberty. Yet as is evident in the analysis offered of case law from 
Europe, Egypt, and India, there are remarkable similarities in the structure 
of the legal arguments deployed. In all the cases examined, the courts have 
simultaneously upheld the individual’s right to belief while sanctioning the 
public display of these beliefs, especially of religious minorities. As our con-
tributors show, what is shared in these judgments is the deployment of the 
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concept of public order in order to secure the state’s right to intervene and 
regulate the religious practices of its citizens. Thus the French and other 
European states’ ban on the veil are premised on this argument, as is the 
regulation of the right of the Bahais to proclaim their faith publicly in Egypt 
and the Indian court’s rejection of the Muslim minority’s claim to worship 
in the contested site of Ayodhya. In all of these cases, the prerogative of the 
state is predicated on the prior distinction between forum internum and 
forum externum that essentially allows the state simultaneously to uphold the 
immunity and sanctity of religious belief even as it regulates the manifesta-
tion of these beliefs.
As we argue in our contribution to this volume, “Immunity or Regula-
tion? Antinomies of Religious Freedom,” this inevitably involves the state in 
making substantive arguments and claims about what is essential or ines-
sential to the domain of religious belief (e.g., is the veil an essential part of 
Islam or simply a cultural accretion?), which is a violation of the state’s claim 
to abstain from intervention in the religious domain. Rather than read this 
contradiction as a corruption of the right to religious liberty, we want to sug-
gest that this antinomy is internal to the conceptual architecture of the right 
itself. The strikingly parallel legal arguments invoked in a variety of con-
texts, with distinctly different models of religion-state ententes, makes this 
evident. Viewed from this perspective, we conclude that the right to religious 
liberty is not simply a legal instrument that protects the sanctity of religious 
belief but also a technology of modern governance that ensures the state’s 
sovereign right to regulate all domains of social life, a necessary part of 
which is religion.
An important theme that emerges from the articles here is how the 
legal concept of public order privileges the beliefs, values, and practices 
of the majority religious tradition in any given polity. We see this in the 
Ayodhya case in India, the Bahai case in Egypt, the Jehovah Witness case in 
Greece, the S¸ahin case in Turkey, the Lautsi case in Italy, and the Dogru case 
in France. Some contributors to this volume (Samuel Moyn and Kapur) view 
this propensity in the jurisprudence of the right to belie its claim to secular 
neutrality. Other contributors (Mahmood and Danchin) see this propensity 
as diagnostic of the necessary intertwining between the religious and the 
secular that characterizes all modern polities despite different models of 
state-religion entente that prevail in a particular polity. “Immunity or Regu-
lation?,” for instance, argues that insomuch as the disciplinary powers of the 
modern state extend over all of social life, the secular state is necessarily 
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involved in regulating the social life of religion and often prescribing sub-
stantive content while at the same time claiming to treat all of its citizens 
equally regardless of their religious commitments. This dual impetus inter-
nal to secular governmentality is evident in the two parts of the right to 
religious liberty discussed above: the first that enshrines religious belief 
as an inner sanctum protected from state intervention, and the second that 
authorizes the state to sanction and regulate the public expression of reli-
gious beliefs. The former promises civil and political equality across lines of 
religious difference, and the latter lodges majoritarian values and sensibili-
ties in the very substance of a nation’s laws. If indeed this tension is internal 
to the right to religious liberty, and the modern secular state more broadly, 
then, as the essay concludes, religious intolerance cannot be understood sim-
ply as a product of cultural, religious, or social values but requires that we 
attend to the operation of modern secular power in generating new forms of 
religious prejudice and enhancing old ones.
There is another important consequence that follows from the concep-
tualization of the right to religious liberty as a technology of modern gover-
nance, namely its role in settling and generating geopolitical conflicts. This 
dimension of religious liberty comes to the fore most forcefully in the contri-
butions by Moyn and Melani McAlister. Importantly, Moyn shows how the 
concept of religious liberty, far from being a secular instrument, served as a 
weapon during the Cold War against “godless communism” in American 
and European diplomacy. In this formulation, religious freedom was not a 
religious concept but a Christian one deployed in “the holy crusade against 
[Soviet] secularism.” American and European Christian activists played a 
key role in shaping Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
at the end of the Second World War, suffusing it with a “Christian personal-
ist” ethos that persists in the right’s enshrinement of conscience (over other 
aspects of religion) to this day. Moyn echoes Hunter and Bhuta in conclud-
ing that the definition of the right to religious liberty has changed depend-
ing on the political context in which it is inserted and the national security 
interests it is made to serve. It is not surprising therefore that when its target 
was godless communism during the Cold War, it had a Christian cast, and 
now that the target is Islam in Euro-American states, religious liberty has 
come to be cast as a secular principle. The targets of religious liberty may 
have changed (from communists to Muslims) but its rationale as an instru-
ment of raison d’état continues to be evident.
If Moyn’s focus is on Cold War geopolitics as a decisive factor in the 
development of the concept of religious liberty in international law, then 
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McAlister’s essay provides a different geopolitical arc that cuts across the 
divide between the North and the global South. It concerns the rearticula-
tion of the Christian evangelical movement in America, which, following 
the end of the Cold War, came to focus its energies on Islam as the new 
enemy of Christendom globally. Their most notable success was the pas-
sage of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) by the US Congress 
in 1998, which charges the US State Department to monitor and sanction 
infractions of religious liberty globally, especially when the victims are Chris-
tians and the perpetrators Muslims. McAlister follows the unfolding of this 
ambitious project in Southern Sudan where American evangelicals mobi-
lized on behalf of Sudanese Christians, making wide use of IRFA and in the 
process deploying a uniquely American vision of religious liberty and racial 
politics. While the persecution of Southern Christians was quite ferocious 
by the North Sudanese government, in saving these persecuted souls, the 
American evangelicals (blacks and whites) projected their own imaginary 
of race, redemption, and slavery onto the Sudanese, indelibly transforming 
the self-understanding of the local players and the racial topography of race 
and religion. The American conception of race was anachronous to the Suda-
nese reality, but it became widely adopted as the civil war raged on and the 
American evangelical activism gave it a new grid of intelligibility. McAli-
ster’s essay powerfully shows that the right to religious liberty is not simply 
a neutral instrument that protects persecuted populations but is also enor-
mously productive and transformative of religious identity, often hardening 
existing lines of religious difference and transforming religious conflicts 
into racial ones by infusing local politics with new meaning.
In conclusion, the essays in this volume provide an account of the 
right to religious liberty in which the power differential between religious 
majority and minority within a polity, between the North and South, between 
the state and its subjects, provides a different interpretive grid for its con-
ceptual and practical understanding. A basic argument that runs through 
these articles is that far from being an instrument of neutrality that protects 
religion or its practitioners, the right to religious liberty also helps create new 
identities, reifies religious difference, furthers state regulation of religious 
life, and at times facilitates the hegemony of powerful geopolitical actors.
By highlighting these aspects of religious liberty, our aim is not to con-
demn it but to bring our attention to the performative and productive capacity 
of this putatively neutral legal instrument to generate new political polariza-
tions. Once we recognize that religious liberty is not universal but necessarily 
context bound, and that the secular and the religious are not in fact opposites 
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but closely intertwined in paradigmatic ways in all nation-states, then we 
might be able to appreciate how the right to religious liberty is not a safeguard 
against state coercion and religious intolerance but at times their vehicle. The 
challenge we are left with is a political problem: how to conceive and institute 
the pragmatics of religious liberty in ways that do not reify the categories and 
operations of the Leviathan and its regulatory powers.
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